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LEVY v. LOUISIANA AND GLONA v. AMERICAN
GUARANTEE & LIABILITY INSURANCE CO.
JoJN C. GiAY, JB.t AND DAvm RuDovsxy tt
Discriminations based on illegitimacy pervade American law.1 De-
riving from a long tradition of prejudice,2 they adversely affect a large
and growing class of persons.' Nevertheless, until the recent decisions
of the United States Supreme Court in Levy v. Louisiana4 and Glona
v. American Guaranty & Liability Insurance Co.,5 invalidating a
Louisiana statute which denied recovery for wrongful death to illegiti-
t A.B. 1964, LL.B. 1967, Harvard University. Member, Massachusetts and New
York Bars. Presently associated with Community Action for Legal Services (CALS).
it B.A. 1964, Queens College; LL.B. 1967, New York University. Member,
New York Bar. Presently a Graduate Fellow in the Community Law and Criminal
Litigation Program at the University of Pennsylvania School of Law.
The authors acknowledge with gratitude the suggestions and assistance of Norman
Dorsen, Professor of Law and Director of the Arthur Garfield Hays Civil Liberties
Program at New York University School of Law.
Messrs. Gray and Rudovsky participated in the preparation of the brief for
appellants in the Levy case.
I The nature of these discriminations is discussed at length in part II infra. They
are in effect in most states. Only Arizona and Oregon have substantially eliminated
legal discrimination against illegitimates. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-206 (1956);
ORE. REv. STAT. § 109.060 (1963). See Krause, Bringing the Bastard into the Great
Society-A Proposed Uniform Act on Legitimacy, 44 TEx. L. REv. 829, 845 (1966).
2 See, e.g., Fodor, Emotional Trauma Resulting from Illegitimate Birth, 54
ARCHIVES OF NEUROLOGY AND PSYCHIATRY 381 (1945); Jenkins, An Experimental
Study of the Relationship of Legitimate and Illegitimate Birth to School and Personal
and Social Adjustment of Negro Children, 64 AM. J. SocIoLoGY 169 (1958).
3 In 1950, the rate of illegitimacy in the United States was approximately one out
of every 25 births. By 1960, the ratio had become one out of 19, and by 1964, one in
15, or about 275,000 out of about 4 million live births. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 47-49 (1966). See also Foster & Freed,
Unequal Protection: Poverty and Family Law, 42 IND. L.J. 192, 220 (1967).
4 391 U.S. 68 (1968)
5391 U.S. 73 (1968).
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mate children and their parents, discrimination based on status of birth
largely escaped constitutional review." This is particularly surprising
during a period in which courts have invalidated with increasing fre-
quency classifications predicated on race7 ancestry,8 and economic
status.9
The decisions in Levy and Glona require a reexamination of the
constitutional limitations on discrimination against illegitimates. The
holdings left important questions unanswered, unnecessarily clouding
the implications of these decisions for remaining discriminations against
illegitimates. We conclude, however, that Levy and Glona provide a
basis from which all the major legal disadvantages suffered by reason
of illegitimacy can be challenged successfully.'0
I. Levy AND Glona
Levy v. Louisiana arose in a context which well illustrates the
typical effect of discrimination against illegitimates. Louise Levy, a
black woman, came to the Charity Hospital in New Orleans with
symptoms of tiredness, dizziness, chest pain, and slowness of breath.
The doctor to whom she was assigned purportedly examined her, but
he failed to take her blood pressure or conduct any other test which
would have revealed that she suffered from hypertensive uremia. The
doctor sent her home with tonic and tranquilizers. When she returned
a week later with more severe symptoms, he merely looked at her, told
her she was not taking the prescribed medicine and recommended a
psychiatrist. Ten days later she died."
Pursuant to the Louisiana wrongful death statute,"2 an action was
brought on behalf of her five children-all illegitimate-for damages
6 The legal issues involved have only recently received any serious attention. The
leading article in the field is Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MIcH.
L. REv. 477 (1967). See also Foster & Freed, Unequal Protection: Poverty and
Family Law, 42 IND. L.J. 192 (1967); Krause, Bringing the Bastard into the
Great Society-A Proposed Uniform Act on Illegitimacy, 44 TEX. L. REv. 829
(1966); Dorsen & Rudovsky, Equality for the Illegitimate?, 8 WELFARE L. BULL.
13 (1967).
7See generally T. EmERSON, D. HABER & N. DORSEN, 2 POLITICAL AND CIVIL
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES (1967).
8 E.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
9E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Douglass v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) ; Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1955).
10 In the wake of Levy and Glona several remaining discriminations have already
fallen. See, e.g., Michaelson v. Undhjem, 162 N.W.2d 861 (N.D. 1968) ; In re Cager,
251 Md. 473, 248 A.2d 384 (1968) ; R. v. R., 431 S.W2d 152 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1968).
11 Brief for Appellant at 4-5, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
12Artiele 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides:
Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him
by whose fault it happened to repair it.
The right to recover damages to property caused by an offense or quasi
offense is a property right which, on the death of the obligee, is inherited by
his legal, instituted, or irregular heirs, subject to the community rights of the
surviving spouse.
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suffered by them for the loss of their mother and for damages based
on the survival of a cause of action for pain and suffering possessed by
their mother at her death. The suit was dismissed by the Louisiana
district court. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the denial
to illegitimates of the right to recover was properly "based on morals
and general welfare because it discourages bringing children into the
world out of wedlock." 's After the Supreme Court of Louisiana
denied certiorari,"4 the United States Supreme Court noted probable
jurisdiction.' 5
In Glona, a Texas domiciliary brought a diversity action in a
federal district court in Texas for the wrongful death of her illegitimate
son in an automobile accident in Louisiana. The court dismissed the
suit, holding that under Louisiana law the mother had no right of
action for the death of her illegitimate child. The court of appeals
affirmed, rejecting the assertion that this construction violated the
equal protection clause.' The Supreme Court granted the petition for
certiorari.' 7
Writing for a majority of six in each case, Justice Douglas held
that the Louisiana wrongful death statute denied equal protection of
the law to both illegitimate children and parents. Read in their broad-
est sense, the opinions condemn generally classifications based on il-
legitimacy. But Justice Douglas did not clearly specify the grounds
for decision and left undiscussed several possible arguments.
In Levy, Justice Douglas began by articulating the general prin-
ciple of equal protection:
While a State has broad power when it comes to making
classifications (Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732), it
The right to recover all other damages caused by an offense or quasi
offense, if the injured person dies, shall survive for a period of one year from
the death of deceased in favor of: (1) the surviving spouse and child or
children of the deceased, or either such spouse or such child or children;
(2) the surviving father and mother of the deceased, or either of them, if he
left no spouse or child surviving; and (3) the surviving brothers and sisters of
the deceased, or any of them, if he left no spouse, child, or parent surviving.
The survivors in whose favor this right of action survives may also recover the
damages which they sustained through the wrongful death of the deceased. A
right to recover damages under the provisions of this paragraph is a property
right which, on the death of the survivor in whose favor the right of action
survived, is inherited by his legal, instituted, or irregular heirs, whether suit
has been instituted thereon by the survivor or not.
As used in this article, the words "child," "brother," "sister," "father,"
and "mother" include a child, brother, sister, father, and mother, by adoption,
respectively.
LA. Cirv. Cone ANN. art. 2315 (West Supp. 1969).
'3 192 So. 2d 193, 195 (La. App. 1966).
14250 La. 25, 193 So. 2d 530 (1966).
15 389 U.S. 925 (1967).
16 379 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1967).
17389 U.S. 969 (1967).
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may not draw a line which constitutes an invidious discrim-
ination against a particular class. See Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535, 541-542. Though the test has been variously
stated, the end result is whether the line drawn is a rational
one. See Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 465-466."8
Next, Justice Douglas faced the issue of what standard should be ap-
plied to determine the validity of the classifications:
In applying the Equal Protection Clause to social and
economic legislation, we give great latitude to the legislature
in making classifications. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,
348 U.S. 483, 489; Morey v. Doud, supra, at 465-466 ...
However . . . we have been extremely sensitive when it
comes to basic civil rights (Skinner v. Oklahoma, supra, at
541; Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669-670)
and have not hesitated to strike down an invidious classifica-
tion even though it had history and tradition on its side.
(Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483; Harper v.
Board of Elections, supra, at 669.) '"
When Justice Douglas's opinion is read together with the dissent
by Justice Harlan, the reader's first impression is that the issue narrows
to a discussion of whether the Louisiana statute is unconstitutional
under the traditional standard applied to economic statutes: does the
classification bear a rational relation to the purposes of the statute? But
Justice Douglas provides the tools for different analyses, for, as the
excerpt quoted immediately above indicates, the Supreme Court has
long viewed with suspicion two types of statutes: (1) those which
encroach on basic civil rights and (2) those which establish classifica-
tions based on race or ancestry. Under the first category, special pro-
tection has been afforded to a wide range of conduct including the
right to vote,2" the right to marry 2 ' and to have offspring,22 and
various rights protected by the first amendment.3 Justice Douglas ap-
parently reasoned that the right to wrongful death recovery, at least in
the context of Levy, was also a basic civil right: "[t]he rights asserted
here involve the intimate, familial relationship between a child and his
own mother." 24
On this basis, he applied the test of stringent constitutional
scrutiny and, as discussed below,2" invalidated the Louisiana classifica-
38 391 U.S. at 71.
19 Id.
2OSee, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
21 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
22 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
23 See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) ; New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Speisser
v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
24391 U.S. at 71.
25Text accompanying notes 42-45 infra.
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tion. The Court's characterization of the rights involved is of no
small significance. If the right to wrongful death recovery is to be
considered "basic" in our constitutional scheme, other economic rela-
tionships which similarly can be said to involve "intimate, familial rela-
tionships" would also seem to be deserving of special constitutional
protections. Although legislative judgments in the area of economic
regulation have been virtually immune from constitutional challenge
under the fourteenth amendment since the thirties, 6 some courts have
recently indicated that legislative or administrative restrictions on
"economic" rights are not to be treated as mere economic regulation
cases if they affect social or political relationships, particularly in the
area of public assistance." Levy may be read to support the emergence
of preferred social and economic rights,-s among which may be a right
to receive welfare benefits or comparable assistance.2 9
To require close constitutional scrutiny in Levy, however, it is
not necessary to argue that wrongful death recovery is entitled to the
protections afforded "basic civil rights." What makes this particular
statute suspect in its own right is that illegitimate status of birth is the
basis of the classification which is used to determine to whom the right
will be granted. The Supreme Court has ruled in several contexts that
classifications based on race or ancestry are "constitutionally suspect" 30
and may only be used if there "clearly appears . . . some overriding
statutory purpose." "' While it can be argued that the fourteenth
amendment applies with unique force to racial discrimination, 2 the
Supreme Court has long invoked equal protection principles to protect
other minority groups from arbitrary governmental action,33 and dis-
criminations based on status of birth are closely analogous to those
predicated on race and ancestry.
26 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952).
27 See, e.g., King v. Smith, 277 F. Supp. 31 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd on other grounds;
Smith v. King, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969);
Williams v. Dandridge, 297 F. Supp. 450 (D. Md. 1969), appeal docketed, 38 U.S.L.W.
3003 (July 1, 1969) (No. 1410, 1968 term; renumbered No. 131, 1969 term) ; Westbury
v. Fisher, 297 F. Supp. 1109 (S.D. Me. 1969).28See Henkin, Forward, The Supreme Court 1967 Termn, 82 HAIv. L. REv. 63,
91-92, n.92 (1968).29 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) ; Rothstein v. Wyman, 69 Civ.
2763 (S.D.N.Y., August 4, 1969).
30 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) ; Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).3 1McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
32 See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro
Freedom, 21 RUTGEIS L. Rav. 387 (1967).
33 See, e.g., Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) ; Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12 (1956) ; Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) ; Takahashi v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) ; Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
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Such discriminations are imposed without regard to an individual's
actions or capacities and affect persons who have no more control over
their birth status than the black man has over the color of his skin.
Consider, for example, Oyama v. California,34 in which the Supreme
Court struck down a provision in California's Alien Land Law which
created a prima facie presumption that title to land conveyed to the
child of an "ineligible alien" (that is, a Japanese citizen), but paid for
by the alien, was held for the benefit of the alien and would escheat to
the state. The Court assumed that the underlying purpose of the Alien
Land Law, preventing ineligible aliens from owning certain types of
land, was constitutional, but ruled nevertheless that the section dis-
advantaging children of the alien violated the equal protection clause . 5
The import of Oyama is clear. Even if the status of a parent can
justify discrimination against him, it cannot justify discrimination
against his child. Discrimination against an illegitimate child because
of the marital status of his parents is in this sense clearly based on
ancestry.
Classifications based on status of birth are also similar to racial
classifications in that illegitimate share with nonwhite Americans a
history of widespread private discrimination reinforced and institu-
tionalized by legal disabilities. They too are second class citizens in
a society in which illegitimacy has been described as a "psychic catas-
trophe." 46 Illegitimates suffer from psychological and social handicaps
closely comparable to those which result from racial discrimination.3 7
In this context it is not surprising that legal discrimination against
illegitimates tends to fall most harshly on blacks and the poor,as and
that in some instances this discrimination may have been designed with
this specific end in mind.39
34332 U.S. 633 (1948).
35 Id. at 640.
36 Fodor, supra note 2.
37See Jenkins, supra note 2.
38
Nationally, in 1963, the Vital Statistics Division of the Public Health
Service, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, estimated that
the white illegitimacy rate was 30.7 per 1,000 live births; the non-white
rate was 235.9. . . . See United States Department of Labor, Office of Policy
Planning and Research, the Negro Family, The Case for National Action
(The Moynihan Report), 8-9, 59. By 1965, the white rate was 39.6 and the
Negro rate was 2632 per thousand live births. U.S. NEwS AND WORLD REPORT,
Oct. 2, 1967 at 84.
Brief for NAACP Legal Defense Fund as Amicus Curiae at 18 n.17, Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
39 In 1960 as part of a large anti-integration package passed at an emergency
session of the legislature, Louisiana instituted new measures to penalize illegitimate
children and their parents. N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1960, at 62, col. 4. "Conceiving
and giving birth to two or more illegitimate children" was declared to be a crime for
both father and mother. LA. REv. STAT. ANx. § 14:792 (1969).
[Vol.l18:1
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Finally, like nonwhites, illegitimates constitute a class that is a
"discrete and insular" minority peculiarly susceptible to prejudice which
tends to "curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to
be relied upon to protect minorities . . . . " 40 Indeed, the stigma of
"bastardy" in American society is so strong 41 that illegitimates may be
even more disabled than nonwhites from forming a political force to
effect changes on a social or legislative level.
Without expressly resolving the question whether the Louisiana
wrongful death statute was constitutionally suspect and, if so, for what
reason, Justice Douglas concluded,
Legitimacy or illegitimacy of birth has no relation to the
nature of the wrong allegedly inflicted on the mother. These
children, though illegitimate, were dependent on her; she
cared for them and nurtured them; they were indeed hers in
the biological and in the spiritual sense; in her death they
suffered wrong in the sense that any dependent would.
We conclude that it is invidious to discriminate against
them when no action, conduct, or demeanor of theirs is
possibly relevant to the harm that was done the mother.4
This holding is unclear in several respects. First, Justice Douglas
never explicitly stated which constitutional standard he was applying.
If, as he implied, the classification bears no rational relation to the
purposes of the Louisiana wrongful death act, the statute is uncon-
stitutional even under the traditional economic standard. The minimum
test under the equal protection clause, of course, is whether this rational
relationship exists.4a It seems beyond contradiction that the purposes
of the statute-"to save [children] harmless during their minority
from the loss of benefits (material and moral) which they would have
received had their [parent] lived up to the time of their respective
Another statute provided that categorical assistance under the Social Security Act
could not be given to a family if the mother had an illegitimate child after receiving
assistance. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46:233 (1969). Under this "suitable home" plan,
6,000 families with 22,500 children were removed from public welfare. Ninety-five
per cent of those affected were Negroes, although two-thirds of the welfare caseload
a few months earlier were Negroes. W. BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN, 183
(1965). This requirement was prohibited in a major statement by the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare. U.S. Bureau of Public Assistance, State Letter
No. 454, Jan. 17, 1961.
40United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). The
Court in Carolene suggested the possibility that minorities are subject to such prejudice
without reaching the conclusion that in fact they are. See also Hobson v. Hansen,
269 F. Supp. 401, 507-08 (D.D.C. 1967), af'd, 408 F2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969), in
which Judge J. Skelly Wright speaks in language indicating that he has assumed
this conclusion.
41 See sources cited note 2 supra.
42 391 U.S. at 72 (footnotes omitted).
43 Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 465-66 (1957).
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majorities" " and to hold torifeasors responsible for their actions-
apply equally to illegitimate and legitimate children.
45
Louisiana, however, asserted as a justification for its statute the
collateral policy of deterring out-of-wedlock births. This argument,
rejected by the Court without discussion, might have been disposed of
on any of three grounds. First, the justification is offensive to common
sense. It would be truly remarkable if persons contemplating behavior
which might produce a child out-of-wedlock were deterred by the
possibility that the child would not be able to recover for their wrongful
death. Perhaps Justice Douglas considered this point too obvious to
state. In Glona, where the deterrence policy had a stronger foundation
because the discrimination was aimed at the "wrongdoing parent," he
dismissed it as "farfetched." 4"
Second, even assuming that the discrimination constituted a
reasonably effective deterrent, a difficult question of equal protection
theory is raised: can a classification which is not rationally related to
the purposes of the statutory scheme be justified by its promotion of
an unrelated state interest? In Levy, the deterrence policy conflicted
directly with the purposes of the wrongful death statute: protecting
dependents and holding tortfeasors responsible for their actions. Justice
Douglas did not advert to the question whether the collateral nature
of the deterrence justification was relevant to the rationality of the
statute since he probably rejected the deterrence theory as factually
unfounded. But his ambiguous language leaves open the argument
that a collateral policy cannot justify a classification under the strict
test of equal protection.4
A third ground for rejecting the deterrence theory is due process.
Two substantive due process theories were urged upon the Court in
44 Eichorn v. New Orleans & C.R. Light & Power Co., 114 La. 712, 724, 38 So.
526, 530 (1905). Louisiana's wrongful death act, like that of most states, was an
"adoption" of the first wrongful death act in England, Lord Campbell's Act, 9 & 10
Vict. c. 93 (1846). Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352, 359 (La. App. 1923). See
generally, S. SPEISER, REcOvERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH (1966).
45 See Middleton v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 70 F2d 326, 330 (2d Cir. 1934):
The purpose and object of the [federal death] statute is to continue the
support of dependents after a casualty. To hold that these [illegitimate]
children or the parents do not come within the terms of the act would be to
defeat the purposes of the act. The benefit conferred beyond being for such
beneficiaries is for society's welfare in making provision for the support of
those who might otherwise become dependent.
Interestingly, the dissent in Glona reached a similar conclusion, 391 U.S. at 80, but
still found no constitutional infirmity in the Louisiana act.
46391 U.S. at 75. It is, however, possible that knowledge of a wide pattern of
discrimination against illegitimates might have some deterrent effect.
47See, e.g., Ratner, Inter-Neighborhood Denials of Equal Protection in the Pro-
vision of Municipal Servces, 4 HARv. Cirv. RIGHTS-CIv. LiB. L. REv. 1, 15-18 (1968) ;
Note, Student Deferment and Equal Protection, 1 COLUM. SURVEY OF HUMAN
RIGHTs L., 68, 77-79 (1968) ; cf. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966) ; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) ; Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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Levy.' One was the requirement, similar to that of equal protection,
that the laws serve a rational purpose. 9 The other was the principle
which precludes a state from denying persons rights on the basis of a
condition over which they have no control. In the leading case for the
latter theory, Robinson v. California,50 the Court ruled that the "status"
of narcotics addiction was an "illness which may be contracted inno-
cently or involuntarily" and, therefore, punishment for the condition was
"cruel and unusual" under the eighth and fourteenth amendments.5 '
Other courts have applied the "status" principle to invalidate laws
penalizing vagrancy.52  In a more recent case, Powell v. Texas,53 the
Court refused by a 5-4 margin to extend the Robinson rationale to
benefit a chronic alcoholic convicted of public drunkenness. The de-
cision in Powell, however, turned on a concurring opinion of Justice
White, who, while declining to reverse the conviction on the particular
facts, said: "Unless Robinson is to be abandoned, ..... the chronic
alcoholic with an irresistible urge to consume alcohol should not be
punishable for drinking or for being drunk." ' Thus, Powell can be
read to stand for the proposition that it is unconstitutional to penalize
criminally the status of "chronic alcoholism."
Since illegitimacy is a status which attaches to a person at birth
as the result of conduct of other persons, due process should preclude
the denial of rights otherwise available to him on that basis.55 Justice
Douglas seemingly adverted to due process principles in his conclusion
that "it is invidious to discriminate against [the Levy children] when
no action, conduct, or demeanor of theirs is possibly relevant to the
harm that was done the mother." -" Whether or not this statement
was intended to dispose of the deterrence argument on due process
48 Brief for Appellant at 19-21, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
49 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 249 (1957) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring). This is one of several areas where equal protection and due process
principles "merge." See Labat v. Bennett, 365 F2d 698, 723 (5th Cir. 1966). As the
Supreme Court has stated: "[T]he concepts of equal protection and due process, both
stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive." Boiling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
50 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
61 Id. at 667.
25See Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y. 2d 309, 229 N.E.2d 426, 282 N.Y.S2d 739
(1967); Smith v. Hill, 285 F. Supp. 556 (E.D.N.C. 1968); Baker v. Binder, 274
F. Supp. 658 (W.D. Ky. 1967); Alegata v. Massachusetts, 353 Mass. 287, 231
N.E2d 201 (1967).
G3392 U.S. 514 (1968).
54 Id. at 548-49.
55 A leading legal philosopher, Professor Lon Fuller, maintains that a rule which
an individual has no opportunity to obey is not a law at all, but an arbitrary appli-
cation of governmental force. L. FuLLER, THE MoRALITy OF LAW, 39, 70-73 (1964).
See also Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
The principle is also analogous to the constitutional prohibition against ex post
facto laws.
56 391 U.S. at 72 (footnotes omitted).
19691
10 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
grounds, the language suggests the viability of a due process approach
in other cases.5
7
Further ambiguities in the Levy opinion derive from the Court's
emphasis on the care and attention Louise Levy gave her children and
its conclusion that "in her death they suffered wrong in the sense that
any dependent would." s Probably as a result of this emphasis, upon
remand the Supreme Court of Louisiana said in dictum that
[t]he United States Supreme Court has held that . . . when
a parent openly and publicly recognizes and accepts an il-
legitimate to be his or her child and the child is dependent
upon the parent, such an illegitimate is a "child" as expressed
in Civil Code Article 2315.-9
Thus the Louisiana court would limit Levy to cases in which the il-
legitimate child has been informally acknowledged and is an actual de-
pendent. However, neither of these limitations is constitutional. First,
the Louisiana court would substitute a requirement of informal acknowl-
edgement for its old requirement of formal acknowledgement.00 But to
the child the new requirement is equally as objectionable as the old since
he has no control over either kind of acknowledgement."'
Second, since the legitimate child does not need to prove actual
dependency to recover, 2 neither should the illegitimate one. While a
state could limit recovery to those actually dependent on the deceased,3
status of birth cannot constitutionally be used as an indicator of de-
pendency. Not only is there probably no empirical proof that illegiti-
mate children are less often dependent on their mothers than legitimate
children, but even if there were a demonstrable connection between
legitimacy and dependency, the state could not use this suspect classi-
fication because it could achieve the objective of limiting recovery to
dependents by requiring all claimants to prove dependency. The use
of status of birth as an indirect method of identifying nondependents
-57A due process approach is also suggested as a basis for the decision by the
Court's rhetorical question: "Why should the illegitimate child be denied rights merely
because of his birth out of wedlock?" Id. at 71.
681d. at 72.
59 Levy v. Louisiana, 253 La. 73, 80, 216 So. 2d 818, 820 (1968). On remand
from the United States Supreme Court, the Louisiana Supreme Court raised on its
own motion the question whether the Court's decision had established a cause of action
for the illegitimate children or whether it had invalidated the Louisiana wrongful
death statute with respect to all recovery by children. The Louisiana court ultimately
allowed the plaintiffs a cause of action. 253 La. 73, 216 So. 2d 818 (1968).
60 Under an 1870 Louisiana law, some children can be legitimated by notarial act.
See LA. CMv. CODE ANN. arts. 200-05, 208-09, 212 (West 1952).
61Text accompanying notes 107-111 infra.
62 See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West 1969).
6 See note 62 supra. The survivorship aspect of the Louisiana statute, discussed
at text accompanying notes 81-88 infra, allows children to recover even if they suffered
no damages personally.
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violates two closely related constitutional principles. It is unnecessary
because a less drastic means of achieving the public purpose exists. It
is also unnecessary because it is imprecise: many children, like the
Levys, are dependent and some legitimate ones are not. Under most
circumstances a state need not choose the most precise way to fulfill its
purpose, merely one which has some rational tendency to do so.' How-
ever, where basic civil rights or suspect classifications are involved, the
principle is well established that the state must select the method of
achieving its goal which least prejudices those within the protected
group.65
The Court has relied on the requirements of necessity and pre-
cision as the basis of decision under several constitutional clauses to
protect a number of substantive rights. It has identified two basic
kinds of statutory imprecision: overinclusiveness and underinclusive-
ness. In the area of basic civil rights, overinclusiveness is seen, for
example, in the doctrine of "overbreadth," which requires that when
first amendment rights are threatened, even statutes seeking permissible
goals must be narrowly drawn." The same principle applies when
other fundamental rights are threatened. 7 The Court dealt with a
different type of statutory imprecision in Skinner v. Oklahoma ' where
it struck down a classification on the ground, not that it was overbroad,
but that it was underinclusive. An Oklahoma law allowed compulsory
sterilization of certain habitual criminals. The proscribed crimes in-
cluded common law larceny, but excluded embezzlement. While con-
ceding that a state normally is given wide deference in its classifications
and was not constrained from recognizing degrees of evil, the Court
held that where fundamental rights were at stake, the state could not
single out a particular group while excluding other groups whose
position cannot be rationally differentiated."v
More recently, in Aptheker v. Secretary of State,7" the Court ap-
plied the concepts of both overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness to
a statute that made it a crime for members of Communist organiza-
tions, which had been ordered to register under the Subversive Activi-
ties Control Act, to use or apply for passports for foreign travel.
Identifying the purpose of the statute as the protection of national
security,7 ' the Court held that the statute swept "too widely and too
6 4 E.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
6
5 See notes 20-23 supra & accompanying text.
'OSee, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) ; Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940) ; Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) ; Lovell v. Griffin,
303 U.S. 444 (1938).
6
7 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
68 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
0 Id. at 542.
70 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
71 Id. at 509.
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indiscriminately across the liberty" I of travel protected by the fifth
amendment:
The prohibition against travel is supported only by a tenuous
relationship between the bare fact of organizational member-
ship and the activity Congress sought to proscribe. The broad
and enveloping prohibition indiscriminately excludes plainly
relevant considerations such as the individual's knowledge,
activity, commitment, and purposes in and places for travel. 73
For example,
[I]f a notified member of a registered organization were to
apply for a passport to visit a relative in Ireland, or to read
rare manuscripts . . . [at] Oxford University [he] would be
guilty of a crime; whereas, if he were to travel to Canada or
Latin America to carry on criminal activities directed against
the United States, he could do so free from the prohibitive
reach of [the statute].'
The Court relied on a similar theory in United States v. Brown.75
There it held that a statute making it a crime for a member of the
Communist Party to serve as an officer of a labor union was an un-
constitutional bill of attainder because it was both "too narrow in
specifying the particular class . . . [and] too broad in treating all
members of that class alike." 76
While the cases in which the requirements of necessity and pre-
cision were developed involved basic civil rights, the underlying prin-
ciples have been carried over to attack racial and other suspect classi-
fications. The Court applied the necessity standard most clearly to a
suspect classification in McLaughlin v. Florida,7 7 in which Florida
argued that a statute outlawing interracial "cohabitation" was rationally
related to its ban on mixed marriages. Assuming, arguendo, that the
marriage bar was constitutional, the Court said,
Florida has offered no argument that the State's policy against
interracial marriages cannot be as adequately served by the
general, neutral, and existing ban on illicit behavior as by a
provision . . .which singles out the promiscuous interracial
couple for statutory treatment.78
72Id. at 514.
73 Id.
74M. at 512.
75 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
76 Id. at 464 (White, J., dissenting).
77379 U.S. 184 (1964).
78 Id. at 196. See also id. at 197 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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In McLaughlin, the Court did not rely on the imprecision of the chal-
lenged statute, but on the more general principle that the racial classi-
fication was unnecessary. The imprecise statute is an a fortiori case,
however, since existence of the more precise way of achieving a goal
will always make the more burdensome method unnecessary, and hence
unconstitutional.
Returning to the interpretation of Levy suggested by the Louisiana
court, the use of status of birth as an indirect test of dependency is both
unnecessary and imprecise.79 Since illegitimacy, like race, must be
considered a suspect classification,"° the Louisiana interpretation is un-
constitutional on this basis also.
A final difficulty with the Levy opinion is its failure to deal sep-
arately with the survivorship provision of the Louisiana statute.' In
a survivorship action, the amount of damages is fixed by the claim,
based on pain and suffering, which the mother had at her death. Conse-
quently, allowing illegitimate children to recover necessarily reduces
the share of any legitimate children. This is not true in a wrongful
death action, where the damages recoverable are those individually
suffered by each child. Because of the possibility of prejudice to
legitimate children, the survivorship provisions are arguably justified
by two additional policies, "family unity" and "presumed intent."
The "family unity" policy is based on the assumption that illegiti-
mate children are not usually part of a parent's family unit, and, hence,
that the protection of their interests is somehow less important to
society. The basis of this assumption is highly doubtful: many il-
legitimate children are treated as equal members of the family, espe-
cially in their relationships with their mother. In the Levy case itself,
Justice Douglas noted the close relationship between the children and
their mother.8" Even if most illegitimate children were not members
of their parents' family circles (as may be true with their fathers), the
"family unity" argument would still fail. Since some illegitimate chil-
dren enjoy a close parental relationship and some legitimate children do
not, the intimacy of such relationship, like actual dependency,' cannot
be accurately measured by status of birth. Accordingly, if a state
wants to make rights dependent on family intimacy, it must measure
that quality directly.
The "presumed intent" theory derives from the fact that the
survivorship aspect of the Louisiana statute is similar to intestate suc-
7 9 See text accompanying notes 64-78 supra.
so See text accompanying notes 30-41 supra.
s8 This provision is set forth in note 12 supra.
82 391 U.S. at 72.
8 3 Text accompanying notes 64-78 supra.
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cession in that it involves the statutory transfer of property which the
deceased owned at his death. Such a provision may embody a legis-
lative attempt to distribute the property as the deceased would have
wished if he had had an opportunity to express himself."' Under this
theory, the presumed desire of parents to exclude their illegitimate
children from recovery would explain the classification. Nevertheless,
this explanation is constitutionally inadequate to permit the result.
First, since the rule burdens members of a suspect classification, the
state must demonstrate that the legislative presumption with respect to
the intent of decedents is reasonable. The principle is well established
that there must be a rational relationship between the fact proven and
the fact to be presumed." This may not be possible. Second, even if
it is reasonable to presume that the deceased intended to exclude their
illegitimate children from recovery, court enforcement of the discrim-
inatory intent of decedents arguably constitutes invalid "state action"
under Shelley v. Kraemer.6 In Shelley, the Court held that equal
protection prohibits enforcement by the courts of restrictive covenants
based on race. While this rule has been subject to diverse inter-
pretation and discussion, 7 its application here may be appropriate since
the state is in some sense fostering discrimination by attributing an
invidious intent to those who may not in fact have it."8
It could be argued that both the "family unity" and "presumed
intent" theories were considered in Levy as general justifications for
the survivorship aspect of the statute, and that they were therefore im-
plicitly rejected. Since Louise Levy had no legitimate children, how-
ever, a more reasonable conclusion is that the Court failed to discuss
these theories, because it considered them irrelevant on the particular
facts of the case. Accordingly, the question should still be considered
open in cases where legitimate children are present, but the above
analyses should be dispositive.
The Glona case presented a reverse fact pattern-the mother of an
illegitimate child sought to recover for her child's wrongful death.
84 Intestacy legislation may alternately reflect a related policy of distributing
property on the basis of a social plan which society deems fairest. Text accompanying
notes 155-156 infra.
85 See, e.g., Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943); Western & Atl. R.R.
v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 (1929); Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1 (1929);
McFarland v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 241 U.S. 79 (1916).
86334 U.S. 1 (1948).
87 See, e.g., Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for A Revised Opinion, 110 U.
PA. L. REv. 473 (1962); Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action" Under
the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. REv. 208 (1957); Pollak, Racial Dis-
crimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 12-13 (1959); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARv. L. Rzv. 1, 29-30 (1959).
88 Cf. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
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Thus, although the discrimination complained of was based on il-
legitimacy, the case was different from Levy in that the parent of the
illegitimate, and not the innocent child, stood to lose by the state action. s9
The policy of deterrence therefore had at least a colorable basis. Never-
theless, the Court again found
no possible rational basis . ..for assuming that if the natural
mother is allowed recovery for the wrongful death of her il-
legitimate child, the cause of illegitimacy will be served. It
would, indeed, be farfetched to assume that women have il-
legitimate children so that they can be compensated in dam-
ages for their death. A law which creates an open season on
illegitimates in the area of automobile accidents gives a wind-
fall to tortfeasors. But it hardly has a causal connection with
the "sin," which is, we are told, the historic reason for the
creation of the disability.'
In finding "no rational basis" for the classification, the Court did
not apply the strict test of equal protection.91 On the other hand,
Justice Douglas specifically rejected the argument "that since the legis-
lature is dealing with 'sin,' it can deal with it selectively and is not
compelled to adopt comprehensive or even consistent measures." 92 In
sum, the Court appears to have taken a middle ground: a classification
based on illegitimate parenthood is perhaps less suspect than one based
on status of birth, but more so than one involving mere economic regu-
lation, where the Court has approved "selective . . .measures." 13
We believe that classifications based on illegitimate parenthood
should be constitutionally suspect. While parents of illegitimates have
had the opportunity to avoid their status, like their children they
suffer from a history of prejudice; " and like their children, they are
an "insular minority" unable to defend themselves through the political
process. Finally, even assuming that the state can constitutionally
regulate extramarital sexual activity,95 it should be required to proceed
with care in an area where both intimate human relationships and long-
standing prejudice are involved.
A further constitutional argument against discrimination based on
producing illegitimates-the right to privacy--derives some support
89 391 U.S. at 75.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 70-71.
92391 U.S. at 75. The Court recognized the additional danger that "[o]pening the
courts to suits of this kind may conceivably be a temptation to some to assert mother-
hood fraudulently," but held that this problem concerned "burden of proof" and,
therefore, was not a sufficient ground for upholding the Louisiana classification.
Id. at 76.
93 E.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
94 See sources cited note 2 supra.
95 See text accompanying notes 96-104 infra.
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from the Glona opinion. At the heart of the state's position in both
Levy and Glona is its asserted power to deter illegitimacy by limiting
sexual intercourse to married couples. But it is arguable that the "zone
of privacy" in the area of sexual relationships in marriage which was
recognized by the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut 6 should
include private sexual activity between consenting adults. Although
seven Justices of the Court in four opinions had difficulty articulating a
rationale for the result in Griswold,97 the lowest common denominator
of their views is that the fourteenth amendment protects certain intimate
personal relationships from governmental intrusion.' The need for
this protection has been described by one commentator as follows:
[A] freedom to determine the extent to which others may
share in one's spiritual nature, and the ability to protect one's
beliefs, thoughts, emotions, and sensations from unreasonable
intrusions are of the very essence of life in a free society.99
If privacy in sexual relationships between consenting adults is con-
stitutionally protected, the state may not intrude unless it can demon-
strate a "compelling interest." 100 The primary interest asserted, of
course, is the deterrence of illegitimacy. But what are the states' more
specific interests in that policy? Although a state might have a financial
interest if illegitimate children were more likely to become public charges
than legitimate children, it can protect its purse by "less drastic
means" 101 than depriving parents of illegitimate children of rights of
action, prominent among which is the enforcement of support statutes
against fathers of illegitimate children. The more important policy is
promotion of the family as an institution. But, since the state has
already stated that unmarried parents both have a duty of support, and
since, in many instances, they provide the same love and devotion as
married parents, the state's interest appears to be in formal marriages
as such. However, the dangers to the public which would result from
substantial decrease in formal marriages are as yet undocumented. More-
over, in Glona and Levy, Louisiana's willingness to allow a parent to
"cure" his sin through acknowledgment, undermines their claim of a
96381 U.S. 479 (1965).
97 Id. passim.
98 Although Griswold can be limited on its face to protect only actions between
people who are married and are in the privacy of their own homes, the Court has
recently shown that they do not consider the marital relationship crucial to matters
of sexual privacy. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
99 Beaney, The Griswold Case and the Expanding Right to Privacy, 1966 Wis.
L. REv. 979, 995. See also, Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of A Doctrine, 64 MicH.
L. REv. 219, 229 (1965); Freid, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968).
100 381 U.S. at 502, 504 (White, J., concurring).
101 See 381 U.S. at 486, 497-98 (Goldberg, 3., concurring), 502, 504 (White, J.,
concurring).
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substantial state interest in regulating the sexual relationship which
produced the child.
The question whether formal marriage promotes the interests
traditionally associated with that institution is outside the scope of this
paper, but it certainly is subject to reexamination in light of developing
concepts of individual freedom and morality. Increasingly the right of
government to prohibit or discourage "immoral" conduct which dam-
ages no other public interest has been seriously challenged. The re-
porters of the Model Penal Code, for example, concluded that laws en-
forcing purely moral standards raise both constitutional and practical
problems in a diverse society, and are therefore "inappropriate for
government .... " 02 Similarly, the British Wolfenden Commission
decided that the "realm of private morality [is] . . . not the law's
business." 103
Although Justice Douglas did not discuss the right to privacy in
Glona, he implicitly questioned whether the state has a proper interest
in deterring illegitimacy. He twice placed quotation marks around the
word "sin" in using it to describe the state's interest in controlling the
behavior of the parents, thus questioning the validity of the state's
power in this area and perhaps raising the issue whether the Griswold
"privacy" theory may not be relevant. 0 As with the due process
suggestions in Levy, however, the Court did not elaborate, thus leaving
this issue open.
Justices Harlan, Black and Stewart dissented from both decisions
in a single opinion. 15 They disagreed with the majority on two
fundamental points. First, Justice Harlan, writing for the three dis-
senters, denied that the classification at issue in the cases (" [t] he differ-
ence between a child who has been formally acknowledged and one
who has not" 106) was inherently suspect, and therefore rejected the
strict standard of equal protection adopted by Justice Douglas. While
Justice Harlan seems correct in dealing with the basis of the classi-
fication rather than the nature of the right, he failed to recognize the
invidious results of the requirement of acknowledgement--depriving a
child of rights that he would otherwise have because of something as
completely beyond his control as the color of his skin. Surely, the dis-
senters would not tolerate a wrongful death statute which denied re-
102 MODEL PEINAL CODE § 207.1, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
103 Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE L.J. 986,
990 (1966).
104 391 U.S. at 75.
10-5 Id. at 76. For an excellent analysis of Justice Harlan's dissent, see Krause,
Legitimate and Illegitimate Offspring of Levy v. Louisiana-First Decisions on Equal
Protection and Paternity, 36 U. CHL L. REv. 338, 342-45 (1969).
"06 391 U.S. at 81.
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covery to blacks, but they failed to discuss how illegitimates were in
any different constitutional posture. 17
Second, Justice Harlan argued that the discrimination does serve
rational purposes. To begin with, it enforces the formalities of mar-
riage and acknowledgement:
If it be conceded, as I assume it is, that the State has power
to provide that people who choose to live together should go
through the formalities of marriage and, in default, that people
who bear children should acknowledge them, it is logical to
enforce these requirements by declaring that the general class
of rights that are dependent upon family relationships shall be
accorded only when the formalities as well as the biology of
those relationships are present.0 8
Justice Harlan's implicit argument that a state should be able to
justify an individual discrimination in the context of its overall statu-
tory scheme without having to demonstrate that each individual dis-
crimination constitutes a reasonable deterrent seems correct. This
argument, however, does not meet all of the objections raised against
the Louisiana scheme. First, with respect to discrimination against the
illegitimate child, no answer is provided for the due process objection
to the requirement of acknowledgement.0 9 But even where the dis-
crimination is directed at the parent of the illegitimate instead of the
innocent child, Justice Douglas correctly pointed out that Louisiana's
sanctions against illegitimates are neither "comprehensive [n]or even
consistent," " especially since any parent who is aware of the law
need not suffer any disadvantage from his child's illegitimacy because
he is allowed to acknowledge the child and enjoy the resulting benefits.
Finally, even if a state had a comprehensive scheme of sanctions, the
deterrent theory would probably still be "farfetched." I" The fear of
a potential illegitimate parent that neither he nor his child could benefit
from the other's death under wrongful death, inheritance, or welfare
provisions is probably not substantial enough to constitute a reasonable
deterrent.
Justice Harlan would also uphold the Louisiana statute on the
ground that "a State may choose to simplify a particular proceeding
107 The dissent suggests that a state may classify persons "in terms of their legal
rather than their biological relation." Id. at 79. This statement is meaning-
less. As Justice Douglas answered, "To say that the test of equal protection should
be the 'legal' rather than the biological relationship is to avoid the issue. For the
Equal Protection Clause necessarily limits the authority of a State to draw such 'legal'
lines as it chooses." Id. at 75-76.
'
0 8 Id. at 80.
109 Text accompanying note 107 supra.
110 391 U.S. at 75.
Mll Id.
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by reliance on formal papers rather than a contest of proof." 112 This
proposition raises the question whether substantive rights (here the
right to recover for wrongful death) can be denied because of problems
of proof and the danger of fraudulent claims. Again, since acknowl-
edgment is beyond the control of illegitimate children, any formal
requirement with respect to their claims would be the practical equiv-
alent of a total bar. Since due process is not offended where the dis-
crimination is directed against the parent of the illegitimate, it could be
argued that the enforcement of the requirement of acknowledgment
against him is not unreasonable. Nevertheless, the majority in Glona
specifically held that the danger of fraudulent claims in this context can
only be dealt with by imposing an appropriate burden of proof."' This
seems correct since the danger of fraud by either the parent or the
child is not serious in cases involving maternal relationships because the
same records normally exist whether or not the mother is married.
The more difficult problems involved in proving paternity will be dis-
cussed below.n' 4
II. THE EFFECT OF Levy AND Glona ON OTHER FORMS OF
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ILLEGITIMATES
The broad language of the Court in the Levy and Glona opinions
indicates the beginning of a general change in the legal status of il-
legitimates. While the decisions were tied to the particular statute,n 5
Justice Douglas made no apparent effort to limit their effect, although
the Court had been informed of the nature and extent of other dis-
criminations against illegitimates." 6  Levy and Glona leave open sig-
nificant questions because the majority did not grapple with the more
difficult issues presented, and because the cases did not involve all the
policies which might be offered to justify classification on the basis
of illegitimacy. But the application of the principles established by the
Court to the undecided issues should lead to the end of all the major
legal disadvantages under which illegitimates now suffer.
A. Support
Discrimination in the area of parental support is perhaps the most
fundamental disability imposed on illegitimate children, since the duty
112 Id. at 80.
13 Id. at 76.
114 Text accompanying notes 124-134 infra.
115 391 U.S. at 69 n.1.
116 In response to a request by Justice Fortas during oral argument, counsel for
appellants in Levy filed a supplemental memorandum of law outlining the nature and
extent of discriminations against illegitimate children in state law. Federal law
affecting illegitimates was discussed in the Brief for Appellants at 11 n.7, Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
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of support initially defines the legal relationship between the child and
his parents. Although mothers apparently owe their illegitimate chil-
dren support in all states,"T fathers escape any liability in some states,'1 s
and in one the duty attaches only after acknowledgement." 9  But even
where the duty is owed, it is likely to be less extensive for illegitimate
children than for legitimate ones. In some states, for example, a child's
right to support ends at a younger age if he is illegitimate. 2 °
The denial to an illegitimate child of equal rights to parental sup-
port cannot be justified under Levy. The denial clearly does not deter
illegitimacy; indeed, to allow a parent to escape his usual liability could
have the opposite effect. On the other hand, the "family unity" policy
might be asserted to justify discrimination in regard to the duty to
support. With respect to the mother, the justification is no more con-
vincing here than it was in the wrongful death situation.'" With re-
spect to the father, although the family unity argument appears to be
stronger since illegitimate children are usually not members of his im-
mediate family circle, the existence of an intimate relationship is irrele-
vant to the purpose of support statutes: guaranteeing children a mini-
mum standard of living. A child may be equally destitute inside or
outside the family circle. Legitimate children, although not living with
their fathers, are entitled to a full right to support.
It is also evident that the goals of simplifying proof and preventing
fraud cannot justify the discrimination, at least with respect to support
from the mother. The danger of fraud is not greater in this situation
than it was in Glona where the Court explicitly held that the possibility
of fraudulent assertion of motherhood could only be dealt with by
burden of proof.1 2   In fact, there is probably less danger in an asser-
tion of relationship by a child against a living mother than in a claim
of parenthood by a mother with respect to a deceased daughter. The
fact that if the claim of the "daughter" is fraudulent it will threaten
the interests of an innocent woman, instead of a tortfeasor as in Glona,
is too minor a distinction to justify a different result, especially since
the problem of proof is not substantial with respect to motherhood.
2 3
The difficulties of proof are more serious, however, with respect to
the father. Although the development of increasingly sophisticated
117 No state has held to the contrary. See 10 Am. JUR. 2d Bastards § 67 (1963).
118 See Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MIc~r. L. REv. 477,
478 (1967).
119 VA. CoDE ANN. § 20-61.1 (1960).
120 See Krause, Bringing the Bastard into the Great Society-A Proposed Unli-
form Act on Legitimacy, 44 TEX. L. Rlv. 829, 850-52 (1966).
12 1 Text accompanying note 83 supra.
1= 391 U.S. at 76.
=23 See text accompanying note 113 supra.
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blood tests has somewhat eased the problem, proof of paternity still
involves considerable danger of fraud and inconclusiveness of evi-
dence.-' Blood tests can prove the innocence of fifty per cent of those
men falsely accused of bastardy.'25 They cannot, however, demonstrate
conclusively that a given individual is the father, only that he is in the
half of the male population that could be. But can this greater uncer-
tainty of parentage justify a rule which denies the illegitimate child
equal substantive rights?
It is submitted that Levy and Glona, though involving a maternal
relationship, establish the general principle that, where illegitimacy is
involved, a state cannot deny equal substantive rights when other, less
drastic means are available by which it can prevent fraud. Here, the
state can require claimants to satisfy an appropriate burden of proof. 2 '
Under the Levy rationale, the denial to an illegitimate child of the
right to full support from his father must be considered a violation of
the "basic civil rights." 12' The illegitimate child's right to his father's
support is certainly at least as fundamental as his right to recover for
the death of his mother. In addition, the discrimination embodies the
suspect classification of ancestry. Consequently, the state must adopt
the least burdensome method of protecting its legitimate interests.128
Here the least drastic way of preventing fraudulent claims is reliance
on an appropriate burden of proof.
Assuming that a state does use burden of proof, are there any
constitutional limitations on how heavy a burden may be imposed?
One state now conditions paternal support on acknowledgment in open
court.'29 While this requirement might be considered a form of burden
124 The danger of a jury finding in favor of a "wronged woman" despite strong
evidence to the contrary is illustrated by the famous case of Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal.
App. 2d 652, 169 P.2d 442; 74 Cal. App. 2d 669, 169 P2d 453 (1946), in which
Charlie Chaplin was found to be the father of a child although blood tests excluded
the possibility of his paternity. For further discussion of blood tests see sources
cited in note 125 infra.
An extreme case of uncertainty of evidence occurs when several men have had
"access" to the mother. One solution to this special problem is the imposition of
joint liability on the possible fathers. See Note, Liability of Possible Fathers: A
Support Remedy for Illegitimate Children, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 859 (1966).
125 SCHATKIN, DISPUTED PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS 158-59 (2d ed. 1947). The
accuracy of blood tests used to exclude the possibility of the paternity is analyzed
minutely in Ross, The Value of Blood Tests as Evidence in Paternity Cases, 71 HARv.
L. REv. 466 (1958). See also Note, Blood Grouping Tests and the New Kentucky
Solution, 53 Ky. L.J. 790 (1965).
Technological development may some day make proof of paternity routine, see
Krause, supra note 118, at 491, but at present some states do not even allow blood
test evidence to be used to exclude the possibility of fatherhood. See FOOTE, SANDER,
& LEVY, CASES ON FAMILY LAw 50 (1966).
1 26 See Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 391 U.S. 73,
76 (1968). See also text accompanying note 175 infra.
327391 U.S. at 71.
M Text accompanying notes 64-78 supra.
129 Under VA. CODE ANN. § 20-61.1 (1960) acknowledgment must be in open court.
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of proof, it is tantamount to no legally enforceable right to support,
since it depends on the voluntary act of the father. Other states make
actions for paternal support criminal and require proof beyond a reason-
able doubt. 3 Still others demand "clear and convincing evidence of
paternity.'
31
Such burdens raise a different equal protection problem: is the
danger of fraud in paternal support actions by illegitimate children
sufficiently great to justify a higher evidentiary standard? It is doubt-
ful that evidence in paternity proceedings is significantly less certain
than proof in other areas of factual dispute, for example, eyewitness
identification.' But it would probably be difficult to establish this
theory since the courts have traditionally been reluctant to impose con-
stitutional limitations on state rules of evidence except where explicit
rights are involved. 133  Nonetheless, courts might be forced to adopt
this reasoning if a state established a standard of proof so severe that
most illegitimates were barred from recovery.
1 34
Since the Levy decision, courts in four states have considered the
question of the illegitimate child's right to paternal support. Three
courts have held that Levy requires the full equality of illegitimates; one
decision is to the contrary.
In R. v. R.," 5 the Missouri Supreme Court overturned a well-
established rule denying illegitimate children any right to support from
their fathers. A lower court dismissed a petition for support without
adjudicating the disputed issue of paternity. 36 Reversing, the Supreme
Court said that
[t] he principles applied by the United States Supreme Court
[in Levy] would render invalid state action which produces
discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate children
insofar as the right of the child to compel support by his
father is concerned. Under the guise of discouraging illegiti-
macy, states may no longer cast the burden upon the innocent
child.
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court com-
pel the conclusion that the proper construction of our statutory
ISO See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Watts, 179 Pa. Super. 398, 116 A.2d 844 (1955).
:'31 See, e.g., McNeil v. McNeil, 166 Iowa 680, 148 N.W. 643 (1914).
32 See P. WALL, EyEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES (1965). See
also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
=23 See, e.g., Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967).
'1
3 4 Cf. Trent v. Loru, 57 Misc. 2d 382, 388, 292 N.Y.S2d 524, 530 (Bronx County
Family Ct. 1968), in which the court gave a loose interpretation to a New York
acknowledgment provision "with the objective of removing so far as possible the
obstacles to equal treatment of the illegitimate with the legitimate child. See Levy v.
Louisiana . . . ."; cf. Commonwealth v. Dillworth, 431 Pa. 479, 246 A.2d 859 (1968).
25 431 S.W2d 152 (Mo. 1968).
'16Id. at 153.
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provisions relating to the obligations and rights of parents
. . .affords illegitimate children a right equal with that of
legitimate children to require support by their fathers."'T
While the Court's decision is correct on the basis of the analysis above,
its application of Levy was mechanical; like Justice Douglas, the
Missouri court failed to deal with the more complex issues in the case.
In Storm v. None,238 the Family Court for New York County
challenged all aspects of a New York law that gave illegitimates the
right to support but only with substantive and procedural disadvantages
not faced by legitimate children. The court cited Levy and noted that
nowhere was discrimination more suspect than in the area of support.139
The Colorado Supreme Court was faced with a slightly different
problem in Munn v. Muunn"4 At issue was a statute making a jury
verdict for support final except where legitimate fathers could demon-
strate changed circumstances. The court observed that the inflexible
support provision was "equally objectionable from the illegitimate
child's point of view," 141 and further stated:
Levy and Glona point the way to the inescapable conclusion
that the support obligation owed by a father to his legitimate
child cannot differ substantially from the duty owed to his
illegitimate child.1'
Finally, in Baston v. Sears,4 ' the Ohio Supreme Court, by a 4-3
vote, denied an illegitimate child paternal support.'4 Levy had been
decided by the United States Supreme Court after argument in Baston,
and the Ohio majority dismissed the case in a footnote on the ground
that it was "based on the intimate, familial relationship which exists
between a mother and her child, whether the child is legitimate or
illegitimate.' 45  The court went on to reject the equal protection
argument on the novel ground that no state action was involved because
the right to paternal support existed only as a result of
the voluntary contract which is undertaken when marriage
occurs. That contract includes, by way of well understood
137Id. at 154 (citations omitted).
13857 Misc. 2d 342, 291 N.Y.S.2d 515 (New York County Family Ct. 1968).
139 Id. at 346-47, 291 N.Y.S2d at 519-20.
140.. Colo. -, 450 P.2d 68 (1969).
141 Id. at -, 450 P2d at 69.
142 Id.
143 15 Ohio St. 2d 166, 239 N.E2d 62 (1968).
14Id. at 168, 239 N.E2d at 63.
145Id.
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tradition and custom, the promise by the husband to support
children which may result from this relationship which is
favored by the law and public policy. 46
This argument seems entirely unfounded. Not only is the husband's
duty to support imposed by statute in Ohio, 47 but the majority opinion
itself states that the marital relationship is "favored by the law," show-
ing clearly that there is state action involved. The dissent in Baston
saw no problems in the direct application of Levy.' s
B. Inheritance
1. By Illegitimate Children
Another important area of discrimination is that of inheritanct
Only Louisiania denies illegitimate children equal rights of inheritance
from their mother,149 but only two states grant equal rights of inheri-
tance from the father.' Eighteen more give full rights to acknowl-
edged illegitimates.' 5 Four states expressly adopt the common law
rule of no inheritance; the rest have not ruled on the issue.'52 The
illegitimate's rights to inherit from his maternal and paternal kin are
even more limited.'53 Furthermore, most states have ruled that the
word "children" in a will does not include illegitimates unless contrary
intent is shown.'"
The major disadvantage to illegitimates in inheritance involves
intestate succession. Intestacy provisions may embody two related, but
potentially conflicting, policies: distributing property as society deems
fair, and distributing property according to the presumed intent of the
deceased. If a socially equitable allocation were the only purpose of
an intestacy statute, discrimination could not be justified. At a mini-
mum, Levy establishes that a state cannot decide constitutionally that
illegitimate children are less deserving merely because of their condition
of birth. The "family unity" policy is no more convincing here than
14 0Id. at 168, 239 N.E2d at 63-64.
147 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3103.03 (Page 1960) ; cf. Murphy v. Quigley, 5 Ohio
Dec. 680 (1900), af'd, 65 Ohio St. 598 (1901).
148 15 Ohio St. 2d at 170-71, 239 N.E2d at 64-65 (O'Neill, J., dissenting).
149 Note, Illegitimacy, 26 BRooKLYN L. REv. 45, 76-79 (1959). Since publication
of this note, New York law has been changed to give illegitimate children full rights
of inheritance from their mothers. N.Y. EsTATEs, PoWvans & TaUST L. § 4-1.2
(McKinney 1967).
160 See, Note, Illegitimacy, supra note 149, at 76-79.
151 Id.
152 Id.
M Id.
164 95 CJ.S. Wills § 652 (1957).
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it was with respect to wrongful death. If establishing a "presumed
intent" is a purpose of intestacy provisions, the discussion above of this
policy should also govern here. In fact, the argument that Shelley v.
Kraemer 155 forbids a presumption of discriminatory intent is even
stronger here since a deceased normally could have excluded illegitimate
children by will."5 6
Intestate succession from the father raises a further problem: some
states provide that for purposes of inheritance paternity must be estab-
lished during a relatively short period before or after the birth of the
illegitimate child; 157 another occasional requirement is that paternity
be proven before the death of the father.'- Such provisions have the
understandable purposes of insuring that the issue be tried while the
evidence is fresh and that the man "accused" have an opportunity to be
present. The effect of these statutes, however, is to forfeit an infant's
future rights because of the inaction or insufficient action of his mother,
who may often be unaware that anything beyond her own right to
support was at stake. 59 Such statutes raise in a new context the due
process question whether a child can be denied rights because of the
failings of another person. While a number of courts have held that
a statute of limitations can run against an infant,"00 the constitutionality
of these holdings has apparently never been considered by the United
States Supreme Court.16 The argument for unconstitutionality is
particularly strong here. First, the child is disadvantaged under a
suspect classification. But more important, a mother may have interests
conflicting with those of her illegitimate child. For example, she might
wish to avoid the public embarrassment of a paternity proceeding, or
a strong, remaining emotional attachment to the father may stop her
from bringing the action. For these reasons, in order to cut off the
future rights of an illegitimate child, the state should be required to
hold a hearing in which independent representation is provided for
the child.
The denial to illegitimate children of the right to inherit from
maternal and paternal kin is perhaps of minor practical importance.
But because no additional justifications for this discrimination seems
155 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
15 6 See Krause, smpra note 118, at 502.
157E.g., N.Y. ESTATES, PoWERs & TRUST L. §4-12(2) (McKinney 1967).
1'8 Id.
159 Minnesota has attempted to alleviate this problem by allowing the commis-
sioner of public welfare to bring paternity actions to protect the future interests of
illegitimate children. MiN. STAT. ANN. § 257.33 (1959).
1 0 See 54 C.J.S. Limitation of Actions § 235 (1948). See also Pittman v. United
States, 210 F. Supp. 763 (N.D. Cal. 1962).
16' See 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 235 (1948).
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available, it should also fall under Levy, subject to proof of fatherhood
in the case of paternal relationship.
By chance, the first application of Levy came in a case in which
the right to inherit from maternal kin was denied to an illegitimate
child of the mother and to the descendants of her other illegitimate
children. In Michaelsen v. U'ndhjem,62 the Supreme Court of North
Dakota held that the statute denying recovery to the illegitimate child
and his descendants was unconstitutional under Levy. The court said:
Applying the reasoning in Levy, as no action, conduct, or
demeanor of the illegitimate children in the instant case is
relevant to their status of illegitimacy, we conclude that the
classification for purposes of inheritance contained in
§ 56-01-05, which is based on such a status . . . is unreason-
able."-
The court also stated that the statute
which punishes innocent children for their parents' trans-
gressions, has no place in our system of government, which
has as one of its basic tenets equal protection for all."
Although equal protection was the ground for decision, the court's
language also supports the due process argument. In a manner similar
to the United States Supreme Court, however, the North Dakota court
failed to deal with the family unity and presumed intent arguments
which could have been raised with respect to inheritance.'65
A somewhat different set of problems is raised by decisions creat-
ing a presumption that a disposition to "children" does not include
illegitimates. While these decisions, like intestacy provisions, presume
a discriminatory intent, the burden on illegitimates is less serious since
the presumption is rebuttable. An illegitimate who had lived with his
father, for example, could probably recover under a will leaving property
to "children." If it can be shown that the presumption has a factual
basis and if rebuttal is not made unreasonably difficult, this may be one
classification based on illegitimacy which is still constitutional after Levy.
2. From Illegitimate Children
At common law, the rule was that parents were not heirs of their
illegitimate children. 16" This rule, which is still in effect in many
162 162 N.W2d 861 (N.D. 1968).
163 Id. at 878.
164 Id.
165 Invalidating the discriminatory provision, the court held that the plaintiffs
were entitled to recover by the underlying statute. Id. at 879.
106Annot., 48 A.L.R2d 759, 761 (1956).
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states, 16 is now constitutionally invalid under Glona, since none of the
possible justifications for the rule is supportable. Most obviously, the
theory that the conception of illegitimate children would be deterred by
this rule is untenable, especially since a parent normally inherits only
if the child died intestate without descendants.36
A more plausible argument is that the state could condition in-
heritance by a parent on prior acknowledgment in order to encourage
parents to acknowledge. Even if the rationality of this deterrent is
unconvincing, it can also be argued that a person who has refused to
admit parenthood when the admission might have been costly should be
estopped to claim the relationship when it has become advantageous.
If, however, the underlying purpose is to punish parents who fail to
accept their responsibilities, the rule denying inheritance to parents of
illegitimates who fail to acknowledge is imprecise and unnecessary., 9
Not all parents who fail to acknowledge formally have shirked their
duties, as the case of Louise Levy well illustrates. In addition, those
parents of legitimate children, who desert their children, can still inherit.
Because of this imprecision, a state cannot equate a failure to acknowl-
edge with desertion. Instead, it must proceed against unworthy heirs
generally without regard to illegitimacy.
The "presumed intent" justification seems unavailable here because
it is difficult to imagine to whom, other than his parents, an illegitimate
child with no descendants would want his estate to go. Even the usual
argument that an alleged father's paternity should be clearly proven in
order to protect him is less substantial since it is the father himself who
is asserting the relationship.
A less significant form of discrimination denies intestate rights to
the legitimate siblings of illegitimate childrenY For the reasons men-
tioned above, this rule also lacks validity under Levy and Glona.
C. Benefit Distribution Statutes
Discrimination is also embodied in many of the state and federal
laws which allocate income or benefits.-7' While only Louisiana denied
167 Id. at 762-64, 774-77. However, in other states it is modified. Id. at 782-85
(mother), 796-97 (father).
18 26A C.J.S. Descent and Distribution § 33 (1956).
11
9 See text accompanying notes 64-78 supra.
17 OAnnot., supra note 166, at 795-96.
171 Illegitimate children have been the victims of various rules intended to prevent
them from receiving public assistance benefits. See the discussion of the "suitable
home" plan in note 39 supra.
A newer version of the "suitable home" requirement is the "substitute father"
regulation, whereby families receiving aid for families with dependent children are
totally or partially denied benefits when it can be shown that the mother had sexual
relations with a man in or outside her home. The birth of an illegitimate child is
1969]
28 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
illegitimate children wrongful death recovery from their mothers, 1'72
most states give them no action for their fathers' deaths. 3  Courts in
two states have recently dealt with the question of an illegitimate
child's right to recover for his father's death; both allowed recovery.
In Armijo v. Wesselius,7 4 decided shortly after Levy and Glona, the
Supreme Court of Washington recognized strong social and consti-
tutional policies in opposition to discrimination against illegitimate
children and interpreted the wrongful death statute to include them.
The Court rejected the argument that the danger of fraud required the
opposite result, reasoning that "the burden of proof, as in other law
suits, will provide estates ample protection." 175
In a later case, Schmoll v. Creecy,70 the Supreme Court of New
Jersey held that the state's wrongful death provisions, which ex-
plicitly adopted an intestacy rule denying illegitimate children rights
with respect to their fathers, were unconstitutional under Levy. Dis-
tinguishing the case from the intestacy situation, in which the court
believed "presumed intent" might raise an additional problem, 177 the
court held that status of birth was irrelevant to the damage done to
the child whichever parent was involved. The court did not discuss
proof of paternity, probably because it was indisputable on the facts.
78
Most states also deny wrongful death recovery to the parents of
an illegitimate child.'79 Since the legal issues are parellel to those
raised with respect to inheritance from illegitimate children, this rule
should also fall under Glona.
Another discrimination is found in workmen's compensation
statutes: illegitimate children can often recover only if they can prove
actual dependency, while legitimate children usually benefit from a
conclusive presumption of dependency.' 0 As discussed above, this
linking of dependency and legitimacy is both imprecise and unnecessary
and should fall on those grounds.
considered prima facie evidence of the existence of a "substitute father." In King v.
Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), the Supreme Court held that Alabama's "substitute
father" regulation requiring total denial of benefits violated the Social Security Act.
A three-judge court below had enjoined enforcement of the regulation on equal
protection grounds. 277 F. Supp. 31 (M.D. Ala. 1967).
172See Annot. 72 A.L.R.2d 1235, 1236-37 (1960). Decisions in Georgia and
Maryland which denied the recovery were overturned by statute. GA. CODE ANN.
§ 105-1306 (1968) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 67, § 4 (1967).
173 Annot., supra note 172, at 1239.
174- Wash. 2d -, 440 P2d 471 (1968).
'75 Id. at -, 440 P2d at 473.
17654 NJ. 194, 254 A,2d 525 (1969).
'77 Id. at 199-200, 254 A.2d at 528.
178 Id. at 199, 254 A2d at 527.
179 See 25A C.J.S. Death § 35 (1966).
180 See 99 CJ.S. Workmen's Compensation §§ 141(2) (d), 141(3) (1958).
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Among federal statutes,""' the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act ' specifically allows recovery by illegiti-
mate children only if they were acknowledged by, and dependent on, the
deceased. This requirement raises the same issue of formal proof dis-
cussed with respect to Levy."8 The Federal Employees' Compensation
Act,"8 the Copyright Act, 8" and the Federal Employees' Group Life
Insurance Act's 6 have been held to incorporate state laws of inherit-
ance, and thus discriminate against illegitimate children in a similar
fashion. These provisions present constitutional questions identical to
those raised by the state inheritance laws which they adopt, and should
meet a similar fate under Levy.
The Fifth Circuit reached this result in Herbert v. Petroleum Pipe
Inspectors, Inc. 8 7 The representative of two illegimate children sued
under the Jones Act "s which explicitly adopts the provisions of the
Federal Employees' Liability Act. Although previous cases under the
Jones Act held that illegitimates were entitled to recover as a matter
of federal law,"s the district court granted summary judgment to the
defendants on the ground that the illegitimates were not "children"
under the Act, because they were adulterous bastards under Louisiana
law.' 90 The circuit court reversed on the basis of Levy without further
comment.' 9 '
In Haley v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 92 decided after Levy,
a Missouri court held that an illegitimate child could recover for his
father's death under the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance
Act. The court refused to apply Missouri law which would have
disqualified the child, and instead adopted a federal definition of
"children" including illegitimates 9 3 The court said that its decision to
overrule prior cases referring to state law was "bolstered" by Levy.'
'8' See generally, Note, The Rights of Illegitimates Under Federal Statutes, 76
HAgv. L. REv. 337 (1962).
18233 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1964).
183 Text accompanying notes 108-111 supra.
1845 U.S.C. §§ 751-803(a) (1964).
18517 U.S.C. §24 (1964).
1865 U.S.C. §§2091-103 (1964).
187396 F2d 237 (5th Cir. 1968).
18846 U.S.C. §688 (1964).
3
8 9 See Civil v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 217 F2d 94 (2d Cir. 1954) ; In re Estate
of Wenkous, 158 Misc. 663, 286 N.Y.S. 518 (Surr. Ct. 1936). See generally Note,
supra note 181, at 346-53.
190 396 F2d 237 (5th Cir. 1968).
19 Id.
192 434 S.W2d 7 (St. Louis Court of App. 1968).
103 Id.
194 Id. at 12.
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D. Public Housing
Another common form of discrimination against illegitimates is
the exclusion of families with illegitimate children from public hous-
ing."9 5 The constitutionality of this discrimination is complicated by
several factors. First, the general question of the legality of the fre-
quently arbitrary standards and procedures by which housing authori-
ties accept and evict tenants is the subject of much current litigation.'96
Consequently, the reasons for which a housing authority may exclude
actual or prospective tenants are unsettled, other than for failure to meet
income standards. Second, housing discrimination affects both parents
and children so that aspects of both Glona and Levy are involved. A
third complication is that the exclusionary policy often includes both
rejection of applicants with illegitimate children and eviction of tenants
who gave birth while in residence. These two factual settings involve
somewhat different policy considerations.
A number of suits challenging housing discrimination have been
filed,""7 but only one has reached a decision on constitutional grounds.
In Thomas v. Housing Authority,"8 decided in 1967, the federal district
court in Arkansas held that an automatic rejection of two housing ap-
plications on grounds that the mothers had illegitimate children violated
the fourteenth amendment. It found such action to be in "general dis-
harmony with the spirit and aim of the low-rent housing program." 19
In dictum, however, the court added that to insure the morality and
lawful conduct of tenants, the housing authority "might permissibly
formulate a policy giving some evidentiary or presumptive effect to the
presence of illegitimate children." 2'
195 Housing authorities in at least 12 states exclude families with illegitimate
children. See Rosen, Tenants' Rights in Public Housing, in HOUSING FOR THIE POOR:
RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 154, 227 n.170 (1967).
1 9 6In Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268 (1969), the United States
Supreme Court held that a circular recently issued by HUD to local housing
authorities gave tenants the right to notice of the charges against them. See Holmes
v. New York Housing Authority, 398 F2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968). Other cases are noted
in 13 WEL. L. BULL., June 1968, at 15. See generally Note, Public Landlords and
Private Tenants: The Eviction of "Undesirables" from Public Housing Projects, 77
YALE L.J. 988 (1968) ; Freidman, Public Housing and the Poor: An Overview, 54
CALIF. L. REv. 642 (1966) ; Rosen, supra note 195, at 154-250.
197 See, eg., Lewis v. Housing Authority, 397 F2d 178 (5th Cir. 1968) (regulation
requiring eviction of tenant who has an illegitimate child while in residence rescinded
after action brought) ; Teasley v. Housing Authority, No. 68-950 (E.D. Pa., dismissed,
June 7, 1968) (stipulation provides that illegitimacy is not a ground for refusing public
housing applicants) ; Richardson v. Housing Authority, No. 678 (E.D. N.C., consent
order filed, May 13, 1968) (consent order terminates policy of eviction for illegiti-
macy) ; Lewis v. Housing Authority, No. 7-C-355 (E.D. Wis., filed Oct. 31, 1967)
(suit attacks unwritten policy of eviction for having more than one illegitimate child).
198 282 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Ark. 1967).
199 Id. at 580.
200 Id. at 581.
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The exclusion of applicants with illegitimate children involves a
different use of the classification of illegitimacy than that considered in
Levy and Glona. The Authority apparently did not suggest that its
purpose was to deter illegitimacy.2 ' Indeed, the idea that the fear of a
future inability to obtain public housing would help prevent the con-
ception of illegitimate children is as "far-fetched" as the deterrence
justification rejected in Glona. Rather, the defendants attempted to
justify their policy on the ground that it was intended to prevent their
buildings from becoming "hotbeds of delinquency." 202 They argued
that the presence of illegitimate children indicated a danger of antisocial
conduct in the future, which, in turn, justified rejection of the applica-
tions. Faced with this argument, the court concluded that while il-
legitimacy might be of some predictive value, as a sole basis for refusal
it was insufficiently precise. 03 Upon consideration of all relevant
factors, some families with illegitimate children might be good tenants,
while others without such children might prove poor ones. Accordingly,
illegitimacy alone was not an adequate ground for exclusion; but it
could be used as some evidence of a family's undesirability.
The Thomas holding should not be affected by Levy and Glona.
Although the Thomas decision goes beyond the explicit holdings of the
Supreme Court by relying on a theory of statutory imprecision to strike
down a classification which the court believed did have some rational
connection with the purposes of the housing program, this extension is
appropriate. s°
In any event, the constitutional issue is now largely academic be-
cause of the recent mandatory circular, issued by the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD), prohibiting any exclusion
based solely on illegitimacy. 05 The circular quotes from the Thomas
decision and apparently intends to adopt its result.20 6
A more difficult issue is the continuing validity of the dictum in
Thomas that it is constitutionally permissible to consider illegitimacy
as an unfavorable factor in a family applying for public housing. A
housing authority might wish to prevent conduct which presents either
a physical or a moral threat to other tenants. If physically disruptive
behavior is the concern, exclusion for illegitimacy should clearly be
unconstitutional. First, there is no reliable evidence that among eligible
201 Deposition of George Millar, Jr., Executive Director, Housing Authority of
Little Rock, at 39, Thomas v. Housing Authority, 282 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Ark. 1967).
202 Id.
203 Id. at 580-81.
2 0 4 See text accompanying notes 77-78 supra.
205 Office of the Assistant Secretary for Renewal and Housing Assistance, De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development, Circular, Dec. 17, 1968.
206 d. passim.
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families, those containing illegitimate children are unusually likely to
present this kind of threat. Mothers of illegitimate children do not
differ significantly from mothers of legitimate ones, in either back-
ground or behavior.2"7 Another possibility is that illegitimate mothers
are unable to prevent their children from disturbing others: but there
is no indication that illegitimacy is relevant to a lack of parental dis-
cipline.2' The lack of a father in the family may affect parental con-
trol, and since illegitimate fathers are normally absent, families contain-
ing illegitimate children may create special problems." 9 The same,
though, is true of families in which, although the children are legitimate,
the father is missing. Yet these families are not affected by the
illegitimacy exclusion. Thus, whether or not a housing authority could
constitutionally rely on the absence of a father in refusing to accept
applicants, it may not use the suspect classification of illegitimacy as an
indirect way of considering that factor. Such a use of the classification
is clearly imprecise because not all fatherless families include illegitimate
children, and unnecessary because the state could consider paternal
absence directly.
Second, even if the state could prove that illegitimacy was relevant
to the danger of future misbehavior, it should not rely on status of
birth as a factor justifying exclusion.21 There is no indication that a
housing authority could not protect other tenants adequately by ex-
cluding applicants who had a history of the type of conduct which would
interfere with their neighbors' rights. Such a standard could, of
course, be applied on an equal basis to families containing illegitimates.
The director of the Little Rock Housing Authority, however, had
a moral rather than a physical threat in mind when he asserted that
the illegitimacy exclusion was intended to prevent the projects from
becoming "hotbeds of delinquency." The authority claimed that promis-
cuity, and even prostitution, in its buildings had created such an un-
savory atmosphere that "respectable" families were reluctant to live
there.21 ' But assuming that threats of prostitution and promiscuity to
the point of nuisance would be proper grounds for exclusion, the pres-
ence of illegitimate children should not be used as evidence of such a
threat. Their status creates at most an inexact inference of prostitution
2 0 7 See Gilhool, Joseph & Stein, Social Science Data Relating to Policy Excluding
Unwed Mothers from Public Housing, October 20, 1968 (mimeograph, Community
Legal Services, Inc., Philadelphia) ; C. VINCENT, UNMARRIED MOTHERS 53-123 (1961).
20 8 See M. R. WRIGH, 80 UNMA ED MOTHERS WHo KEPT THEm BABiEs (Calif.
Dept. of Social Welfare, 1965); Berg, Utilizing the Strengths of Unwed Mothers in
the AFDC Program, 43 CHILD WEF EAm 333, 337-39 (1964).
209 Id.
210Bt see Thomas v. Housing Authority, 282 F. Supp. 575, 581 (E.D. Ark.
1967).
211 282 F. Supp. at 578-80.
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or overt promiscuity. Since a housing authority has the alternative of
relying on direct evidence of such conduct, it ought not to use a suspect
classification as indirect evidence.
A somewhat more subtle argument is that the very presence of
illegitimate children in a family creates a moral threat by example to
other tenants. But this "moral leper" theory violates the recent HUD
circular mentioned above.212 The circular provides, inter alia, that an
authority may establish criteria for admission and eviction
bearing on whether the conduct of . . . tenants . . . does or
would be likely to interfere with other tenants in such a
manner as to materially diminish their enjoyment of the
premises. Such interference must relate to the actual or
threatened conduct of the tenant and not be based solely on
such matters as the marital status of the family, the legitimacy
of the children in the family, police records, etc.21" 3
This requirement reinforces the conclusion that here, too, the authority
ought not to be constitutionally allowed to use a suspect classification
when other means of determination are available.
The eviction of public housing tenants, when a member of the
family gives birth to an illegitimate child, presents a somewhat different
problem from the refusal to admit a family which already includes such
a child. The assertion that the exclusion deters potential illegitimate
parents is more likely to be accurate. While the extent to which any
sanction actually deters illegitimacy is uncertain, eviction is so serious
a penalty that it is probably as effective a deterrent as the criminal law.
214
But even if the deterrence is effective and even if government can
constitutionally regulate the private non-violent sexual conduct of con-
senting adults, there remains the question whether housing authorities
are the proper bodies to promote the policy of general deterrence. The
HUD circular indicates that the department has concluded that they
are not. The circular would allow eviction only for conduct interfering
with other tenants.21 5  The same result might be reached under the
equal protection clause on the ground that general deterrence is not
related to the purposes of the housing act.216  Although the act does
contemplate that the housing program would promote morality, this
212 Note 205 supra & accompanying text.
213 Id.
214Traditional criminal sanctions against fornication and bastardy have them-
selves been ineffective, at least in part because they have not been enforced. See
Slovenko, Sex Mores and the Enforcement of the Law on Sex Crimes: A Study of the
Status Quo, 15 KAN. L. REv. 265 (1967); Ploscowe, Sex Offenses: The American
Legal Context, 25 LAwV & CONTEMP. PROB. 217, 218-19 (1960).
215 Circular, supra note 205.
21642 U.S.C. §§ 1401-36 (1964).
1969]
34 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
promotion is to result from an improvement in living conditions rather
than from the creation of an agency to review the sexual behavior of
public tenants.
217
This view is supported by Chicago Housing Authority v. Black-
well, 18 where the Supreme Court of Illinois held that a state provision
granting the housing authority power to do what was "necessary" to
secure federal assistance, did not authorize the authority to require a
loyalty oath as a condition to eligibility for low-cost housing.219 The
state housing authority argued that the loyalty oath requirement was pur-
suant to the "Gwinn Amendment" "o to the Federal Housing Act and
was authorized by state law since, in light of the amendment, the oath
would help secure federal funds. The court declared that the purpose
of the state housing law was to eradicate slums and to provide low-
income housing and that the exclusion of otherwise qualified applicants
solely because of membership in a subversive organization did not
further this purpose. Thus it interpreted the state law as not authoriz-
ing the loyalty oath requirement despite the "Gwinn Amendment." "
Similarly, the deterrence of sexual "sin" is no more related to the
purpose of public housing than deterrence of subversive activity.
E. Custody and Visitation
1. The Mother
A mother normally has the right to custody of her illegitimate chil-
dren subject to the same degree of supervision which the courts exercise
over the mothers of legitimate children." This right derives from the
widely recognized common law presumption that maternal custody is
in the best interests of a child. It is therefore clear that the child as
well as the mother has a presumptive right to maternal custody. A
recent custody case, however, illustrates the kind of penalties which
zealous state officials sometimes try to inflict on illegitimates. A
Maryland statute provides that children may be taken from their
mother when they are neglected 2 2 -a condition which is defined to
include the existence of an "unstable moral environment." In ln re
21742 U.S.C. § 1401 (1964).
218 4 Ill. 2d 319, 122 N.E.2d 522 (1954).
219 Id. at 326, 122 N.E.2d at 526.
2 2 0 The "Gwinn Amendment," adopted as a rider to the Independent Offices
Appropriation Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 393, 403 (1952), provides
no housing unit constructed under the United States Housing Act of 1937, as
amended, shall be occupied by a person who is a member of an organization
designated as subversive by the Attorney General.
2214 Ill. 2d at 326, 122 N.E.2d at 526.
= See Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 417, 420 (1964).
2=3 Id. at 427-34.
224 MD. A N. CODE art. 26, § 52 (1967).
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Cager,225 a lower Maryland court held that the birth to a mother of a
second illegitimate child was in itself sufficient evidence of an unstable
moral environment to constitute neglect.
Most first illegitimate children * * The court there stated:
are the result of a mistake * * The second time around
we think represents a lack of judgment and demonstrates an
unstable moral attitude on the part of the mother * * * that
is inconsistent with the minimum moral standard the com-
munity requires.22
The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the lower
court's test for neglect was not "reasonably or fairly implicit in the
statute." " The court said:
The best interest of a child may or may not be served
by removing it from the custody of a mother who has had
another illegitimate child but the sole test, automatically ap-
plied, cannot in fact or law be pregnancy with an illegitimate
child or the recent birth of an illegitimate child added to the
presence of an existing illegitimate offspring. Cf. Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 .... 28
The Maryland court relied on statutory grounds, but it apparently
interpreted Levy expansively to call into question the use of illegiti-
macy as a classification when, although having some relationship to a
legitimate legislative purpose, it imprecisely identifies the group the
state intends to reach. The court also invoked due process principles
to reinforce its statutory holding; it saw the case as having been
instituted not to serve and perpetuate the best interests of the
children but rather impermissibly to use the children as pawns
in a plan to punish their mothers for their past promiscuity
and to discourage them and other females of like weaknesses
and inclinations from future productivity.
229
If the lower court in Cager had merely given some weight to the
presence of more than one illegitimate child in a household, a more
225251 Md. 473, 248 A.2d 384 (1968).
226Id. at 478, 248 A.2d at 387, quoting the circuit court. By stipulation, the
presence of 2 or more illegitimate children in the families of the allegedly neglected
children was the only evidence of neglect before the court. This unusual agreement
occurred because Cager was brought as a test case by the local state attorney in an
apparent campaign to discourage promiscuity and illegitimacy. Id. at 481, 248 A.2d
at 389. The attorney had obtained the information about the families from the welfare
department. The Maryland Court of Appeals relied on this violation of state and
federal statutes on the confidentiality of welfare records as an alternate ground
for reversal. Id. at 481, 248 A.2d at 389.
227 Id. at 479, 248 A2d at 388.
2 28 Id. at 480, 248 A2d at 388.
29 Id. at 480, 248 A. 2d. at 389.
19691
36 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
difficult question would have been raised: does state regulation of the
moral atmosphere created by a mother's consensual sexual conduct
violate either her right to privacy in sexual matters 23o or her right to
raise her children in accordance with her unconventional views? 2'
2. The Father
At common law, a father never had the right to custody of his il-
legitimate child,232 but in a number of states this absolute rule has been
altered by statute and judicial decision. In many states, a father is now
able to obtain custody after the death of the mother.13 3 The question of
paternal custody also arises when a mother decides to relinquish the
child. Usually the father's consent to such relinquishment is not re-
quired, as it would be with respect to a legitimate child unless the father
had been adjudicated unfit.23 4  Some states even exclude the father
from any participation in the resulting custody hearing.
2 3 5
There seems to be no proper reason for this exclusion. The re-
striction has no significant deterrent value, and a court would obviously
be under no obligation to accept the suggestions of a father it con-
sidered unreliable. If a father desires custody of the child either when
the mother relinquishes it or when she dies, the more complex question
arises: whether he should have the same presumptive right to custody
which is accorded a legitimate father." 6 In the absence of justification
for the denial of such a right, a similar presumption should be accorded
an illegitimate father since the act of stepping forward is prima facie
evidence of the father's devotion to the child's welfare. It may be
argued that an illegitimate child living with his father would be par-
ticularly susceptible to suffering because of his status. In fact, the
opposite is probably true. In at least one state, an illegitimate child
who lives with his father is automatically legitimated.237 Even where
such a statute does not exist, the child probably has a greater oppor-
tunity of gaining legitimate status living with his father.
Additional considerations enter where the illegitimate father also
has a legitimate family.2 2 The influence and interests of the legitimate
23o Text accompanying notes 95-104 supra.
31 Cf. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
23= See Note, Father of An Illegitimate Child-His Right to Be Heard, 50
MiNN. L. Rxv. 1071, 1072 (1966).
23 Id. 1073-74.
24 Id. 1075-76.
23 Id. 1076 n.29.
23See Boone v. Wyman, 295 F. Supp. 1143 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal docketed,
No. 33243, 2d Cir., Feb. 6, 1969.
7 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 230 (West 1954).
238 Cf. Krause, supra note 118, at 503.
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wife and children could certainly be considered in a custody hearing.
Unless the illegitimate child is adulterous, however, the problems are
really no different from those presented when a divorced and remarried
man desires custody of his legitimate children by his first wife. Thus,
aside from the special problem of the adulterous child, denial to the
illegitimate father of a presumptive right to custody lacks a rational
relation to the object of custody provisions. This result would not
prevent a court from refusing custody to an illegitimate father it found
unfit, since a legitimate father could be refused on a similar basis.
A related issue is the right of a father to visit his illegitimate child
while the child is in his mother's custody. Most states allow visitation
depending on the situation of the particular child, whether or not il-
legitimacy is involved,239 and a number of cases have specifically given
illegitimate fathers the right to visit.
4 ° In Wallace v. Wallace,24 how-
ever, the Supreme Court of Illinois stated that the Illinois paternity act
established a conclusive presumption that an illegitimate father had
absolutely no visitation rights and by logical implication ruled that this
was in the best interests of the child.2  While there may often be
special reasons for denying visitation rights to an illegitimate father, the
unrebuttable presumption created in Wallace is imprecise because an
opportunity to see his father might sometimes be a clear benefit to the
child. Although visitation is usually a matter left to a court's largely
unreviewable discretion, the rationale of Glona would support the right
of a father of an illegitimate child to appeal to judicial discretion, even
though the exercise of this discretion will often deny him the right
to visit.
A recent case has raised the issue, in an unusual context, of a
father's right to visit his illegitimate child. A county welfare board
interpreted federal and state statutes conditioning eligibility for the
Aid for Dependent Children (AFDC) Program on the "continuing
absence" of a parent. The effect of this requirement was to deny
benefits to illegitimate children visited by their fathers, but not to
legitimate children visited by divorced or separated fathers. In Jones
v. Welfare Board,243 the mother of two illegitimate children has sued
239 Note, A Father's Right to Visit His Illegitimate Child, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 738,
739 (1966).
24o Id. 739-40. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rozanski, 206 Pa. Super. 397, 213
A.2d 155 (1965).
24160 Ill. App. 2d 300, 210 N.E.2d 4 (1965).
242 The court's holding was concerned with a procedural aspect of the case. It
denied the child any common law basis to sue for his father's companionship. How-
ever, the court made it quite clear that an illegitimate father had no right to the
custody or society of his child.
243 No. 4-68 Civ. 248 (D. Minn., filed July 30, 1968) (temporary restraining
order).
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on behalf of herself, her children, and others simliarly situated to
enjoin the enforcement of the welfare board's policy on the grounds
that it violates equal protection, due process, and the right to privacy.
The federal district court in Minnesota has granted a temporary re-
straining order against termination of AFDC benefits to the named
plaintiffs.2 The purpose of the denial of aid is apparently to regulate
the sexual activities of welfare mothers by denying access to likely sex
partners. This regulation should be illegal under King v. Smith.
There the Supreme Court held that Alabama's "substitute father" rule
denying aid to families in which the mother was having sexual relations
violated the Social Security Act. 4" Even if legal under the Act, this
policy cannot justify the burden on illegitimate fathers and children
under Levy and Glona. The rule is imprecise because it unnecessarily
excludes consideration of factors relevant to deciding whether there is
a danger of illicit sex: for example, the actual relationship between the
parents, the age of the children, and the place of visitation.
F. Name
A less tangible form of discrimination which illegitimate children
now suffer is the denial of a right to use their father's name.247 Al-
though most illegitimates live with their mothers and might prefer to
use her name, some do not and may prefer their father's name.
Although the effects of this deprivation are uncertain, the disadvantage
seems unjustifiable under Levy. It has been suggested that the denial
to illegitimates of this right is reasonable because a family name serves
the function of identifying an individual with a "nuclear" family
group,m and a father's illegitimate child will not usually be a member
of this group. But identification of the "nuclear" family is probably
not the purpose of names, since they are commonly shared by a much
larger group of relatives, and since legitimate children, not living with
their fathers, are not disqualified from using his name. If anything, a
name seems to identify a group bound by certain legal relationships.
Since the discriminations against illegitimates with respect to other
legal relationships are now invalid under Levy and Glona, there is no
longer any justification for discrimination with respect to name, assum-
ing, of course, that paternity has been established.
244 Id.
245392 U.S. 309 (1968).
246 Id. at 327. See also note 171 mipra.
247See Krause, note 118 .rupra, at 503.
248.1d.
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III. CONCLUSION
Because the Levy and Glona decisions dealt summarily with a
particularly unreasonable statute, they did not consider all the possible
justifications for classifications based on illegitimacy. The Court did,
however, establish that a state will carry a heavy burden in attempting
to show a reasonable relationship between a classification based on il-
legitimacy and a legitimate state purpose.2 ° It is also important that
in Glonca the Court considered and rejected the claims that an illegiti-
mate parent's problem of proving relationship justified a denial of sub-
stantive rights 0 and that the policy of deterrence justified a discrim-
ination against illegitimate parents.2 1 Thus, while the Court wrote
cryptically, its opinions indicate that no major discriminations against
illegitimates should survive.
In the cases involving discrimination against illegitimates decided
since Levy, the courts, like the Supreme Court itself, have failed to
discuss all the problems involved. Most have accurately, but inade-
quately, treated the discriminations as the vestiges of earlier social
customs. Although the new attitudes of these courts are a welcome
change, the refusal of at least one court to extend the principles of Levy
to the paternal relationship indicates that a more thorough analysis
of the issues will be necessary before illegitimates are everywhere
guaranteed the "correlative rights which other citizens enjoy."
' 251
249 391 U.S. at 71-72.
25o 391 U.S. at 76.
251 Id. at 75.
252 391 U.S. at 71.
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